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Abstract 
The authors of this paper provide a critical analysis of the most prominent 
theoretical vehicles employed in studying differentiated integration 
in contemporary, post-Brexit Europe. They discuss the descriptive, 
explanatory, and interpretative potential of the selected theoretical 
approaches that are applied at the intersection of disintegration and 
European differentiation discourse. “The holy grail” of the theorising 
of the dynamic (and accelerating) processes of (dis)integration and 
differentiation remains undiscovered. Nevertheless, a constant search for 
theoretical explanation is needed in the in-depth analyses of the current 
state of the European Union. 
Keywords: Theorising, European Union, Disintegration, Differentiation, 
Post Brexit
Introduction
Differentiated integration in Europe, as well as the inter-related 
problem of (dis)integration risks and externalities, has reached the 
very top of the agenda both in scientifi c and public discourse. Even 
though it has been present in the European integration project for 
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decades, never before has it gained so much attention due to its saliency 
and dynamism. The so-called Brexit and the shift in French and 
German attitudes towards differentiation (those attitudes being open, 
permissive, accepting and even welcoming in nature) has changed the 
“ever closer Union” paradigm substantially. Britain’s departure from 
the EU will widen the circles of integration, while at the same time the 
Franco-German engine is determined to deepen integration, and the 
two dynamics will most probably result in a system of differentiation, 
unknown so far in the history of the European integration project. The 
new, evolving situation requires intense scientifi c investigation that will 
enhance our knowledge and understanding of the current state of the 
European integration project.
The concepts used, similarly to the standard ones exploited in the 
differentiated integration literature, range from the Europe a’la Carte 
metaphor, through a Europe of different speeds, concentric circles, 
differentiated geometries, up to the diversifi ed hemispheres of integration.1 
More and more analysts, experts, and academics claim that the observed 
increase in differentiation hit the limits in which it carries the potential 
for disintegration. Exemptions from the Eurozone and Schengen area 
have already been quite prominent examples of differentiation. But 
undermining one of the four freedoms (the free movement of people), 
which was the case in the (in)famous Brexit referendum, attacks one of 
the fundamentals and questions the very idea of the European integration 
project. Openly opposing the very core of the Single Market changes the 
direction of Europe’s integration trajectory.
The story of European integration can be told as a story of its 
deepening and widening – these two dynamics have been the foundation 
of the mechanics of differentiation so far. Consequently, the progress 
in integration has resulted in an increase in differentiation over time.2 
However, the most recent political and economic developments in the 
European Union (EU) and beyond clearly show that differentiation has 
gained momentum, and its dynamics have accelerated. This demonstrates 
the extraordinary signifi cance of the scientifi c problem to be solved. One 
of the most important characteristics of the contemporary European 
integration process requires further exploration in order to advance our 
understanding of its dynamics and determinants. It is fundamentally 
important from the point of view of scholarly explanation as well as being 
1  S.S. Andersen, N. Sitter, Differentiated Integration: What is it and How Much Can 
the EU Accommodate?, “Journal of European Integration”, no. 28(4)/2006, pp. 313–330.
2  F. Schimmelfennig, T. Winzen, Grand theories, differentiated integration, “Journal 
of European Public Policy”, no. 26(8)/2019, pp. 1–21.
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furthermore crucially salient from a practical point of view of the extant 
phenomena; the shedding of a little light on the critical point in which 
a uniting Europe has found itself.3
Consequently, the authors of this paper provide a critical analysis 
of the most prominent theoretical vehicles employed in studying the 
differentiated integration in contemporary, post-Brexit Europe. They 
discuss the descriptive, explanatory, and interpretative potential of the 
selected theoretical approaches that are applied at the inter-section of 
disintegration and European differentiation discourse. “The holy grail” 
of the theorising of the dynamic (and accelerating) processes of (dis)
integration and differentiation remains undiscovered, nevertheless, 
a constant search for theoretical explanation is needed in in-depth analyses 
of the current state of the European Union. 
The Post-Brexit Context of (Dis)Integration 
and Differentiation in Europe
The political idea of differentiated integration can be traced back 
to the famous Tindemans report (1975),4 where, as a legal concept, it 
appeared in the Single European Act (1986). Academic debate on the 
topic fi nds its roots in Dahrendorf ’s formulation of Europe a la carte 
(1970s.) Already by the 1980s, scholars identifi ed several variations of 
differentiated integration and the scientifi c discourse has exploded ever 
since. From that moment on, many various conceptualisations can be 
traced throughout literature, including fl exible integration, a multi-
speed Europe, Europe as an empire, a Europe of variable geometries, 
concentric circles, hemispheres, etc. Yet differentiated integration has not 
been studied enough, especially in comparison with the huge quantity of 
literature on integration as a whole. The reason for this is an assumption 
that differentiated integration’s signifi cance as a political phenomenon 
would erode over time.5 That Member States (and their neighbourhood) 
would converge over time and that the same variously applied policies 
would fi nd their cohesive end.
3  R. Riedel, Great Britain and Differentiated Integration in Europe, in: Brexit, History, 
Reasoning and Perspectives, eds. D. Ramiro Troitino, T. Kerikmä e, A. Chochia, Cham 
2018, pp. 99–112.
4  L. Tindemans, European Union. Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of 
Belgium, to the European Council, “Bulletin of the European Communities”, Supple-
ment 1/76 (commonly called the Tindemans Report), 1975.
5  B. Leruth, C. Lord, Differentiated integration in the European Union: a concept, 
a process, a system or a theory?, “Journal of European Public Policy”, no. 22(6)/2015, 
pp. 754–776.
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There are many ways of analysing this multifaceted phenomenon, 
from an analysis of the primary and secondary law, through multilateral 
negotiations, up to and including party politics in domestic contexts. It 
can be studied as a phenomenon, concept, process or as a system. The 
complexity and plurality of approaches is justifi ed by the very nature of 
differentiated integration. When it comes to the theoretical relevance 
of Brexit (as the sparking impulse for the recent eruption of scholarly 
literature dedicated to (dis)integration and differentiation within 
European integration, it is the duty of our scholars to present a reasonable 
explanation why such a phenomenon could occur within the framework 
of the European Union, while also presenting information and solutions 
to withhold disintegration. European integration knew for several 
decades just one way forward: integration towards a (supposedly) ever-
closer union. Major setbacks which led to the opposite happening became 
mostly prominent after the Euro crisis, such as the Schengen suspension 
for a brief period of time. 
Also, literature shows us that in the last few years, the Brexit phenomenon 
has become a very common talking point in social circles and not only is 
it in European literature, but also in international relations. On a much 
broader scale, one can underline that globalisation and information 
technology have changed the Westphalian nation-state system with its 
state-centric approach to politics into a denser network reuniting states 
as sovereigns but also joining multiple non-state actors. After decades of 
the globalisation and internationalisation of the international political 
landscape, it becomes even more interesting to analyse subjects where the 
reverse action is recognisable. 
As depicted in this paper, Brexit presents itself as a novelty in 
European integration; when it comes to keywords such as European 
identity, regionalism, and supranationalism, the disintegration of the 
United Kingdom has a multi-layered effect on several aspects of the 
polity, politics, and policies of the political administrative system of 
the European Union as an international organisation but also on the 
Member States. Therefore, social and especially theoretical relevance 
have to be acknowledged. Here, differentiated integration studies could 
develop themselves as a core mainstream component of European Studies 
in the post Brexit-era. Both scholars and practitioners could benefi t 
tremendously from understanding what lies ahead for the post-Brexit 
European Union.
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(Ex-post) Theorizing European Integration 
Before heading deeper into the diversity of European integration 
theories, it behooves the reader to gain a short yet overall understanding 
of what “integration theory” stands for in a broad perspective. When 
looking at the semantics of “integration” and “theory” it becomes evident 
what these two concepts can contribute to garnering an understanding 
of their assembled defi nition. At fi rst sight, “integration”, when taking 
into consideration the deliberations of Ernst B. Haas (of one of the 
world’s most famous neo-functional integration theorists), is the “process 
whereby political actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded 
to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new 
center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states”.6 With neo-functionalists, the creation of a new 
polity becomes imminent. When mentioning the neo-functionalist take 
of integration, one has to glance at the other main team in European 
integration which is represented by the liberal intergovernmentalists, 
who determine that it is more the creation of institutions which Member 
States join than the political actors themselves.7
Both parties, neo-functionalists and liberal intergovernmentalists, 
see integration as a process though which resembles their common 
denominator. The latter outlook on European integration will be of no 
concern of the thesis but receive an overarching outlook on the general 
concept of European integration theories, and liberal intergovernmentalism 
had to be presented in order to make the picture of European integration 
complete.
The study of integration theory allows us to obtain a more detailed 
understanding of how the European Union as a regional international 
organisation works. One of the key reasons why integration should be 
studied is its process-oriented depiction of reality and should show the 
institutions engaged within their policy schemes. Just looking at the rigid 
institutions alone will not present the full picture, will result in us not 
learning everything we need and the decision-making processes within 
the European Union will be able to be ignored.
But where does differentiated integration fi t in the picture of European 
integration theory? Even though differentiated integration has become 
one of the core elements of the EU grand-theory wise, rarely has it been 
addressed accordingly in scholarly literature. Hence, the grand theories have 
6  E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–1957, 
Stanford 1958, p. 16.
7  A. Wiener, T. Börzel, T. Risse, European Integration Theory, Oxford 2019, p. 3.
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focused almost solely on uniform integration. In the vast majority of the 
existing literature, we derive the relevant hypotheses about differentiated 
integration from the old-fashioned European integration theories like 
liberal intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, and post-functionalism.8 
In an analysis of EU legislation based on treaty material in the making 
between 1992 and 2016, we fi nd evidence that the heterogeneity of both 
wealth and identity, integration in the area of core state powers, and pre-
existing differentiation drive differentiated integration. While comparing 
the explanatory power of the grand theories, it was noted that neo and 
post-functionalism explain the differentiations that Member States obtain 
in EU reform treaties and explain them in a more convincing manner than 
liberal intergovernmentalism.9 It is merely the fact that the old-fashioned 
European integration theories have had a ceasing explanatory power when 
it came to different aspects of European integration. An example of this 
can be found in the accession rounds with different conditions connected 
to the specifi c accession of the Member States.
In a sense, differentiated integration has always been connected with the 
Brexit case because of the nature of the exemptions that the UK received as 
part of their preferential membership. Studies on differentiated integration 
have failed to agree on a common theoretical base of the differentiated 
integration for a long time. Regarding the defi nition, scholars are also still 
in dispute over its consequences.10 Subsequently this new phenomenon 
of differentiated integration was invented by the scholars particularly 
because the classic grand integrations theories ceased to provide fertile 
explanations. But also, because the real-life increase in the number of 
exemptions such as opt outs and enhanced cooperation, protocols within 
the European Union were indisputably on the rise. It provided a widening 
and deepening of the European Union on a different scale with different 
speeds, allowing those who wanted to engage in a more intense integration 
a more prosperous and advanced integration. This clearly becomes evident 
when looking at regulations and directives in the EU legislation process. 
Here, differentiated integration is key because directives, for instance, can 
implement a certain time-frame to make them binding for all European 
Member States in order to respect the imbalanced gradient from North to 
South within the European Member States. 
In addition, when looking at differentiated integration from the 
perspective of Leruth et al., and their historical and diachronic perspective, 
8  F. Schimmelfennig, T. Winzen, op.cit., pp. 1–21.
9  Ibidem, p. 3.
10  B. Leruth, S. Gänzle, J. Trondal, Exploring Differentiated Disintegration in a Post-
Brexit European Union, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, no. 59(5)/2019, p. 5.
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it becomes evident that the volume of differently implemented legislation 
has substantially increased. Apart from the ascending volume, different 
forms of differentiation have also been acknowledged resulting in the 
establishing of differentiated integration as a bedrock of European 
Studies.11 But differentiated integration can be best understood as an 
institutional response to the increasing heterogeneity of the Member 
States. In the integration process in which a specifi c Member State 
group is not subject to the same union laws as competing Member State 
groups; “[…] differentiation can be of a long, medium, or short-term 
nature and take effect either in primary or secondary law of the European 
Union”. Particular forms of differentiation stretch beyond the EU’s 
borders including non-EU states. Differentiation can represent a useful 
measurement for managing heterogeneity among intra-EU Member 
States overcoming stalemate situations.12 But at the same time, it can 
risk provoking disintegration or dissolution trends within the European 
Union as a supranational regional organisation.
Ever since the European Union came into existence, scholars have 
tried to determine whether the EU fi ts into different classifi catory tables 
to determine what kind of “animal and species” the European Union’s 
characteristics can be best compared with.13 Some scholars such as Ferry14 
or Schmidt15 claim that the Union may be asserted with the connotation 
of a completely new state. Another cast of scholars, including Hix,16 regard 
the European Union as a non-state political system. When it comes to 
differentiated integration, one could remark that it is a scholarly concept 
that is a relatively new phenomenon in European studies, or, more broadly; 
international relations, legal studies, political science, or economy.
In the European Union we are experiencing a “polycrisis”, as Jean-
-Claude Junker, the former EU Commission President, once emphasised. 
It is a mixture of a sequence of the euro crisis, the migration crisis, the 
Brexit referendum, the coronavirus pandemic, along with the democratic 
backsliding in Central Europe. There are different scenarios towards 
11  B. Leruth, S. Gänzle, J. Trondal, op.cit., p. 5.
12  F. Tekin, Differentiated Integration at Work: the Institutionalization and Implemen-
tation of Opt-Outs from European Integration in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
“Studies on the European Union”, no. 6/2012.
13  B. Leruth, C. Lord, Differentiated integration in the European Union: a concept, 
a process, a system or a theory?, “Journal of European Public Policy”, no. 22(6)/2015, 
p. 752.
14  J.-M. Ferry, La Question de L’État Européen, Paris 2000.
15  V. Schmidt, The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State, 
“Journal of Common Market Studies”, no. 42(4)/2004, pp. 975–999.
16  S. Hix, The Political System of the European Union, Basingstoke 2005.
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which the European Union could be headed in the future. Concerning 
the EU’s future, there are already a number of different scenarios in 
existence. The European Commission presented its White Paper on the 
future of Europe (2017) detailing 5 scenarios on how the European Union 
might develop in the future and how they would be explored until 2025. 
Whereas Scenario 3 resembles and matches “differentiated integration” 
the most, and is where the coalition of the willing, which are different 
sub-groups of EU Member States, would agree on specifi c policy areas.
Differentiated integration (DI) being unique in comparison to old 
fashioned integration theories such as neo-functionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism was not new to the discourse in European 
integration. DI had its fi rst theoretical testings in the 1970s.17 From the 
publication of the Tindemans report (1975) until the early 1990s, the 
density of literature regarding differentiated integration is considered 
rather non-existent and not tremendously developed.18 But it was 
considered as a rather new approach to the concept of Ralf Dahrendorf ’s 
“Europe á la carte”. Without going so far as to propose that a new treaty be 
drawn up, the Tindemans report promoted a consolidation of the existing 
institutional framework and the development of common policy goals. 
DI concepts began to vary so that Alexander Stubb (1996) devoted 
an academic paper to categorise the sheer variety of concepts of DI in 
English, French, and German. “Two-speed, multi-speed, step-by-step, 
strengthened solidarity, graduated integration, hard core, variable 
integration, concentric circles, two-tier, multi-tier, multi-track, two-track, 
‘swing wing’, circles of solidarity, variable speed, imperial circles, pick-and-
choose […]” are a few examples of the rhetoric in English that existed in 
order to describe differentiated integration in the 1990’s. But according to 
Stubb, the excess of terminology may cause even an experienced specialist 
in European integration a “severe case of semantic indigestion”.19
Stubbs’ explorations illustrated that the different semantics of 
differentiation provide a plethora of complex integration strategies, 
responding to the challenges of enlargement using variants of multi-
speed (time), variable geometry (space) and á la carte (matter).20 Realising 
through the exploration of just the semantics in the 1990s that expansion 
always leads to diversity, the various concepts of differentiated integration 
17  F. Schimmelfennig, T. Winzen, Ever looser union? Differentiated European inte-
gration, Oxford 2020.
18  A. Stubb, A Categorization of Differentiated Integration, “Journal of Common 
Market Studies”, no. 34(2)/1996, p. 284.
19  Ibidem, p. 283.
20  Ibidem, pp. 283–284.
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made it possible for the Union to embrace the necessary fl exibility in 
dealing with the strongly varying patterns of integration. 
But what empirical examples can be manifested where differentiated 
integration can be best described and used as an example? Cue, as 
empirical examples, the Schengen agreement and the implementation of 
the Euro as a currency. These examples can be regarded as the two biggest 
projects post-European single market, where the concept of DI enfolded 
in an empirical and practical manner throughout the European Union. 
Highly impressive to see that practice and theory diverged greatly within 
the Union of today. On the one hand, principles such as the principle of 
subsidiarity, the principal of proportionality, and principal of conferral, 
which are laid out in Art 5 TEU, strongly advertised the norm of uniform 
integration. But on the other, the gap between practice and theory widens 
due to the reason why the concept of DI was not mentioned or merely 
approved in the treaties.
Considering the enlargement rounds in 2004, differentiated integration 
received more scholarly attention since the phenotype of a Europe of 
different speeds came about. Here, the notion of a multi-speed Europe 
or a Europe of two different speeds rose in academia during that time. 
Within the enlargement rounds one can clearly see that different state 
groupings within European integration were forming due to the different 
initial bases the Member States were starting from. It is interesting to 
add at this point that after several years of implementing differentiated 
integration, one of the key results could be seen that by the end of the 
decade all legislation was implemented in a different way, and adjusted to 
the needs of the different state groupings. 
After the enlargement rounds of 2004, from 2005 onwards, 
differentiated integration was studied more intensively. Beside the 
theoretical dimension, empirical studies were on the rise by scholars 
such as Miles,21 Marcussen,22 Adler-Nissen,23 and Balzaq and Hadfi eld.24 
Taking the theoretical nuance of differentiated integration into account, 
the interest in academia was rising in order to incorporate this theoretical 
construct empirically. Scholars such as Andersen and Sitter (2006) and 
21  L. Miles, Introduction: Euro-outsiders and the Politics of Asymmetry, “Journal of 
European Integration”, no. 27(1)/2005, pp. 3–23.
22  M. Marcussen, Out of the Box: Coping Successfully with Euro-Outsiderness, “Coop-
eration and Confl ict”, no. 44(2)/2009, pp. 167–187.
23  R. Adler-Nissen, Behind the Scenes of Differentiated Integration: Circumventing 
National Opt-Outs in Justice and Home Affairs, “Journal of European Public Policy”, 
no. 16(1)/2009, pp. 62–80.
24  T. Balzacq, A. Hadfi eld, Differentiation and Trust: Prüm and the Institutional De-
sign of EU Internal Security, “Cooperation and Confl ict”, no. 47(4)/2012, pp. 539–561.
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De Neve (2007) asked about the different typologies of differentiation 
but also gave differentiated integration the notion of adaptation and 
the possibility to change over time. The scholars have mainly analysed 
differentiated integration in retrospective of the creation of the European 
Single Market”.25
According to Olsen,26 the European Union is a conceptual battleground 
and an institutional building site. Olsen therefore put emphasis on 
institutional differentiation, taking the various origins of the EU 
institutional system converting itself into its own sui generis system into 
account. Institutional differentiation was helping to create the identity of 
the institutional set-up of the European Union.
From 2010 onwards, scholars such as Frank Schimmelfennig published 
a great variety of studies taking several nuances of differentiated 
integration into account, namely constitutional aspects, enlargement 
impacts, and the impact on EU legislation.27 In addition to this, there 
was Dirk Leuffen et al.,28 with their famous approach of a “system” of 
differentiated integration which was developed in the 2010’s. In close 
connection with the severe economic crisis in 2007 was the path to the 
study fi eld of European disintegration paved. Many studies have covered 
problems such as the events in Greece, Britain’s troubled relation with 
Brussels, or taken the rising issues with the Schengen agreement into 
account. As depicted in the differentiated integration literature review of 
this paper, it can be said that differentiated integration as a phenomenon 
has always been on the horizon of European integration.
When considering the “new” empirical example of Brexit, one 
can underline the circumstance that it grew together with the real-life 
increase in differentiation (opt-outs, exemptions, enhanced cooperation, 
constructive abstention, special clauses, additional protocols, etc.) 
and London was an unquestioned leader in it. In the last two decades, 
differentiation has been a dominant feature of the European integration 
phenomenon. The United Kingdom has changed its internal position 
from that of an integration-tolerant country, to an integration-rejecting 
25  S. Andersen, N. Sitter, Differentiated Integration: What is it and How Much Can 
the EU Accommodate?, “Journal of European Integration”, no. 28(4)/2006, pp. 313–330.
26  J.P. Olsen, Governing through Institution Building, Oxford 2010.
27  See for example: F. Schimmelfennig, Brexit: differentiated disintegration in the 
European Union, “Journal of European Public Policy”, no. 1(20)/2018, pp. 1–31, or: 
F. Schimmelfennig, Negotiating differentiated disintegration in the European Union, in: 
Differentiated Integration and Disintegration in a Post-Brexit Era, Routledge, Abingdon 
2019, pp. 19–35.
28  D. Leuffen, B. Rittberger, F. Schimmelfennig, Differentiated Integration. Explain-
ing Variation in the European Union, Basingstoke 2013.
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country, which endangers the very fundaments of the integration process. 
It produces externalities to be consumed by other Member States and 
non-members as well. Additionally, the already existent exemptions from 
the Eurozone and Schengen area have already been quite prominent cases 
of differentiation.29
Schimmelfennig, Leuffen, and Rittberger (2015) even emphasised and 
underlined that the EU, as a system of differentiated integration, has two 
verdicts of differentiation. On the one hand, there is the existing vertical 
differentiation which manifests itself in the levels of centralisation but 
there’s also the variation in territorial extension known as the horizontal 
differentiation. “Differentiation has been a concomitant of deepening 
and widening and has increased and consolidated as the EU’s powers, 
policy scope, and membership have grown”.30 Turning to an explanation, 
the contribution attributes the fi gure of differentiated integration in the 
EU to the interrelation of interdependence and politicisation. According 
to Leuffen et al., polities can be conceptualised as a three-dimensional 
confi guration of authority. This level of centralisation manifests in the 
following manner:
First of all, the level of centralisation has to be preexisting, polities that 
monopolise authoritative decisions in the centre have a maximum level 
of centralisation, whereas decision-making authority dispersed across 
a multitude of actors indicate a low level of centralisation. In addition 
to the fi rst condition, the functional scope varies between authority over 
a single issue and authority over an entire range of policies. 
Among the rich diversity of theories to be applied, it is worth 
mentioning post-functionalism that attributes differentiated integration 
and disintegration to a certain level of the politicisation process, which 
shifts European integration themes from the level of interest of group 
politics to the level of mass politics, where the alleged ‘identity logic’ 
of politics has a larger role.31 But when it comes to post-functionalism, 
it originally evolved because it allegedly claims that neo-functionalism 
and intergovernmentalism have become increasingly less useful in 
29  R. Riedel, op.cit., pp. 99–112.
30  F. Schimmelfennig, D. Leuffen, B. Rittberger, The European Union as a system of 
differentiated integration, politicization and differentiation, “Journal of European Public 
Policy”, no. 22(6)/2015, p. 766.
31  L. Hooghe G. Marks, A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus, “British Journal of Political Science”, 
no. 39/2009, p. 93; L. Hooghe, G. Marks, Grand theories of European integration in the 
twenty-fi rst century, “Journal of European Public Policy”, no. 26(8)/2019, pp. 1113–
1133.
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order to serve as a theoretical base for European integration due to the 
aforementioned politisation.32
To explain this shift, post-functionalism proposes several elements 
which can occur singularly or cumulatively: on the one hand, the depth of 
integration while on the other hand, exclusive national identity, but also 
the rise of Eurosceptic parties and referendums in the EU. Furthermore, 
in order to explain disintegrative elements rather than a simple refusal 
to more integration, there has to be a signifi cant increase in these factors 
that drive the mentioned shift.33
Considering politicization, whereas neo-functionalism and intergovern-
mentalism regard European integration as an effi ciently improving proc-
ess where economic players seek gains, post-functionalism emphasises the 
disruptive potential of a clash between functional pressures and exclusive 
identity.34 This approach is deeply connected in the comparative research 
on identity and domestic contestation. 
However, the theoretical outcomes of post-functionalism are open – 
the theory does not implicitly imply integration or disintegration; various 
scenarios are viable. When it comes to disintegration as a theoretical 
concept, neo-functionalism becomes very prominent. Schmitter and 
Lefkofridi35 discuss the relevance of neo-functionalism as a theory of 
disintegration in order to fi nd further explanations for disintegrative 
elements of European integration. They explore neo-functionalism as 
a conceptual and theoretical framework that helps one understand the 
current crisis and explores the future consequences as such a crisis may 
well have in regards to European integration.
Schmitter and Lefkofridi decided not to reject neo-functionalism 
but they want to exploit it scientifi cally. In their work they formulate 
a series of suppositions and hypotheses which are evaluated using existing 
data sources and related research. While testing neo-functionalism in 
disintegration, they made the discovery that the concept of spillover can 
also be reversed. Instead of spillovers, Schmitter and Lefkofridi introduce 
the term of spillbacks, which refer to the predecessor concept just as an 
opposite. Schmitter and Lefkofridi refer to a spillback in a situation where 
Member States no longer wish to deal with a policy at the supranational 
level. While presenting this new theoretical approach, Schmitter and 
32  S. Czech, M. Krakowiak-Drzewiecka, The rationale of Brexit and the theories of 
European integration, “Oeconomia Copernicana”, no. 10/2019, p. 591.
33  F. Schimmelfennig, Brexit: differentiated disintegration…, pp. 1–31.
34  L. Hooghe G. Marks, op.cit., p. 13.
35  P. Schmitter, Z. Lefkofridi, Neo-Functionalism as a Theory of Disintegration, “Chi-
nese Political Science Review”, no. 1/2016, pp. 1–29.
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Lefkofridi name a few examples where such a spillback can be seen as the 
usual code of conduct in the European integration process. The scholars 
say spillback elements can be traced in case of the collapse of the Euro or 
in general when a Member State exits the Eurozone or even the project of 
the European Union itself. As for two hard, factual, empirical examples 
they refer to Brexit and Grexit.36 Usually these spillbacks are promoted by 
parties on the radical left and right within the national political systems. 
Of course, they pursue different political reasons for proposing spillback 
tendencies in both creditor and debtor states. Other scholars such as 
Jones37 do not share the opinion of the already-mentioned scholars 
Schmitter and Lefkofridi. Erik Jones states that the creation of a new 
theory of disintegration that does not share the same common grounds 
as the classical European integration theories is simply unavoidable, 
since he argues that even though these attempts to theorise disintegration 
deal with European integration in general, it does not mean they can 
provide scientifi cally valid and proper information for the research fi eld 
of European integration.
The purpose of his comment “Towards a theory of disintegration” 
is to suggest an overarching theoretical framework to structure the 
existing literature and to suggest new areas for research, while explaining 
the interaction of integration and disintegration at different levels of 
aggregation. But why are the classic European integration theories ill-
equipped to have a deeper understanding of disintegration? The main 
argumentation of Jones38 and other scholars is that transactionalist, 
neo-functionalist, intergorvernmentalist, and institutionalist arguments 
share functionalist tendencies and totally leave out identity politics and 
identity-based political mobilization.39
To assemble European disintegration scenarios for the future, there has 
been a response within the academic fi eld in order to create new theories 
on a post functionalist account such as Hooghe and Marks,40 Schmitter,41 
36  Ibidem, pp. 1–29.
37  E. Jones, Towards a theory of disintegration, ”Journal of European Public Policy”, 
no. 25(3)/2018, pp. 440–451.
38  Ibidem.
39  E. Jones, op.cit., pp. 440–451.
40  L. Hooghe, G. Marks, A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From 
Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus, “British Journal of Political Science”, 
no. 39/2009, pp. 91–195, see also: L. Hooghe, G. Marks, Grand theories…, pp. 1113–
1133. 
41  P. Schmitter, On the Way to a Post-Functionalist Theory of European Integration, 
“British Journal of Political Science”, no. 39/2008, pp. 211–215.
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or Wiener, Börzel and Risse.42 These scholars think that economic 
interests are not the most important element of integration anymore. 
But in this defi nition the major element of the purpose or function of 
integration is missing. This is why the researcher Gunnar Myrdal has 
linked his integration theory to liberalism, which takes the form of the 
“equality of opportunity” in his theoretical framework43. His theory shows 
that economic interests and European identity have been intertwined 
throughout the European project and help us to understand why identity 
based political mobilisation was less important in the fi rst three decades 
of European integration. The “equality of opportunities” is promoted 
by the main European Institutions and should develop a more effi cient 
allocation of resources, which should automatically lead to the accepting 
of the rules of the game by the different participants. This is especially the 
case when it comes to the equality of opportunity and greater effi ciency; 
the critical point is that these are positive and conditional claims rather 
than normative claims. Everything is linked to the type of equality of 
opportunity that was created and the effi ciencies that were implied. These 
are testable hypotheses which can also run in the opposite direction. 
Discriminatory measures that restrict the equality of opportunity can be 
introduced that limit effi ciency and give rise to political confl ict.44
The benefi t of Myrdal’s theory helps one to understand the cycles in 
which both integration and disintegration are moving and only empirical 
testing can tell you which cycle is empirically valid at the time of the 
conducted research. Myrdal’s consecutive model was more interested in 
integration on a global scale and national levels than it was interested in 
European dynamic. But redirecting to Jones’ model, it can be added that 
discrimination of equality of opportunity or the inequality of opportunities 
lies at the root of the disintegrative process, in a comparable manner as 
the equality of opportunity lies at the root of the integrative process.
The works of Schmitter and Lefkofridi45 presented how disintegration 
could be operationalised from the point of view of a theory classic such 
as neo-functionalism. They rely on the old classic European integration 
theories whereas other scholars like Jones46 demand a completely new 
theory of disintegration that is more suitable to the prevalent empirical 
examples such as Brexit. After having discussed the notion of the two 
concepts of differentiated integration and disintegration in general, it is 
42  A. Wiener, T. Börzel, T. Risse, op.cit.
43  After: E. Jones, op.cit., p. 442.
44  E. Jones, op.cit., pp. 440–451.
45  P. Schmitter, Z. Lefkofridi, op.cit., pp. 1–29.
46  E. Jones, op.cit., pp. 440–451.
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the task of the next section to combine these two notions and present the 
theoretical groundwork of “differentiated disintegration”.
Unquestionably, differentiated integration was used for agreements 
in treaties and laws in European Union competencies, to cope with 
the different levels of integration but also with the different economic 
strengths and diverse capabilities to integrate within the framework of the 
European Union. The former prime minister of the United Kingdom in 
his 2013 announcement of the referendum triggered a new process which 
can be theoretically referred to as differentiated disintegration.
Vollaard47 says that it remains too dangerous to just turn the old classic 
integration theories around and use them in an opposite direction to 
theoretically make them fi t to disintegration. This despite the fact that 
Vollaard focused mainly on old classic European integration theories 
such as liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism and did not 
take differentiated integration into account. The question that arises here 
is whether the same can be said for the case of differentiated integration 
in comparison to differentiated disintegration. It becomes evident at this 
point that there is a need to analyse this factum retrospectively.
Just as path-dependent differentiated integration, the concept of 
differentiated disintegration is a rare but signifi cant phenomenon of 
DI in the EU. Admittedly, differentiated disintegration is in line with 
the logic of constitutional differentiation which follows and heightens 
traditional British concerns about the preservation of national sovereignty 
and identity in areas of core state powers. According to Schimmelfennig 
and Winzen48 in negotiations on differentiated disintegration, however, 
Eurosceptic governments become the “demandeurs”, and the other 
Member States become the defenders of the status quo. Differentiated 
integration refers to a situation in which integration progresses overall 
but at least one State remains at the status quo or does not participate 
at the same level of integration as the others. By contrast, differentiated 
disintegration is the selective reduction of a state’s adherence to the 
integrated legal rules, which results in an overall lowering of the level and 
scope of integration.
It can be underlined that between the end of 2015 and the beginning 
of 2016, the negotiations on the UK’s position within the European 
Union concerned internal differentiated disintegration49, since until the 
47  H. Vollaard, Explaining European Disintegration, “Journal of Common Market 
Studies”, no. 52(5)/2014, pp. 1142–1159.
48  F. Schimmelfennig, T. Winzen, Ever looser union? Differentiated European inte-
gration, Oxford 2020, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854333.001.0001.
49  F. Schimmelfennig, Brexit: differentiated disintegration…, p. 5.
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referendum it was unclear whether the UK would remain in the European 
Union. Most scholars and politicians still believed that a negative Brexit 
referendum was not an option at all and that the UK would remain in 
the European Union as part of the 28-Member States during that time. 
The phenotype of internal differentiated disintegration fi ts this phase 
the most because the UK was still in the European Union and arguing 
internally about several disintegrative steps, but not leaving the European 
Union entirely. 
But this change of phenotype from internal differentiated disintegration 
to external differentiated disintegration was about to change due to the 
circumstance of the negative Brexit referendum of June 2016. Since 
then, the negotiations have focused more on a real withdrawal from the 
European Union rather than selective integration as being exempted and 
taken out of the equation of the European Union. Here the mentioned 
shift from internal differentiated disintegration to external differentiated 
disintegration becomes obvious. According to Schimmelfennig, there 
are three types of differentiated disintegration. Unquestionably, the fi rst 
form of differentiated disintegration is connected to the cause of internal 
differentiation which is common in differentiated integration discourse. 
It is called internal differentiated disintegration and occurs when a state 
may seek shallower integration within the EU (internal differentiation).50 
But the most striking thing about internal differentiated integration 
is the fact that it is reliant upon the other EU Member States due to 
the reasons of free-riding, which will be elaborated upon in the next 
paragraph. In addition, internal differentiated integration does not 
include an agreement as it does in the case of external differentiated 
integration.
Here it is in the interest of the Member States as a collective to 
protect their commonalities within the integration project to avoid such 
occurrences and incidents that involve the common free-riding problem 
and cherry-picking behaviour. When it comes to the free-rider problem, 
the EU states realise that they can utilise many of the benefi ts of integration 
even without meeting economic standards. In the times before the Brexit 
vote but being connected to the Brexit case, the then Prime minister 
David Cameron took the decision to link his referendum announcement 
to realise a new contractual settlement for the United Kingdom and the 
European Union.51 The aim was to follow two consecutive goals: to put 
pressure on the other Member States of the European Union in order 
to gain more concessions in future negotiations and secondly, with these 
50  Ibidem, p. 11.
51  Ibidem, p. 15.
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gained concessions by the other Member States, to convince the undecided 
voters to vote to remain in the European Union.
Cameron never had the intention to pursue a hard disintegration of 
the United Kingdom from the European Union, which can be proven by 
a letter from November 2015 to the President of the European Council, 
Donald Tusk, asking for the indulgence of proposed reforms while 
seeking a “moderate expansion of Britain’s differentiated integration in 
the European Union”. The only policy where Cameron clearly expected 
differentiated disintegration and to prevent the UK from engaging was the 
area of immigration. Restrictions on the free movement of EU citizens was 
also intended to limit in-work benefi ts to prevent child benefi t fraud. To 
conclude the deliberations on internal differentiated disintegration, one can 
underline that the phenotype and empirical example was per se existing in the 
time-frame before November 2015. When it comes to external differentiated 
disintegration in contrast to internal differentiated integration, the main 
difference becomes evident in Article 50 of the Treaty of the European 
Union.52 Within the reasons of the concept of “external differentiation”, 
this conceptualisation appears frequently in those empirical cases where at 
least one Member State possesses an advantage in the integration process 
by having left the European Union through triggering the Art. 50 accords.
Conclusions
Both in academic deliberations and in real-life politics, differentiated 
integration concepts have offered, so far, a way out from the dichotomous 
thinking between full membership and full non-membership. Moreover, 
nowadays these concepts are treated much more as a solution than 
a problem. Nevertheless, differentiated integration as a scholarly concept 
is a relatively new phenomenon in European studies, or more widely: 
international relations, legal studies, political science or economy. It grew 
together with a real-life increase in differentiation (opt-outs, exemptions, 
enhanced cooperation, constructive abstention, special clauses, additional 
protocols, etc.). In the last two decades, differentiation has been a dominant 
feature of European integration. It is argued that approximately half of 
EU policies are implemented in different ways.53 Undoubtedly, studying 
52  Ibidem, p. 10.
53  See B. Leruth, C. Lord, Differentiated integration in the European Union: a concept, 
a process, a system or a theory?, “Journal of European Public Policy”, no. 22(6)/2015, pp. 
754–764, and B. Leruth, S. Gänzle, J. Trondal, Differentiated integration and disintegra-
tion in the European Union after Brexit: risks versus opportunities, “Journal of Common 
Market Studies”, no. 57(6)/2019.
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differentiated integration contributes to a better and more refi ned 
theoretical and empirical understanding of the European integration 
process as such. Differentiation in Europe has reached such a phase, scale, 
and depth that it is diffi cult to disagree that it is a systematic characteristic 
of the European integration project as seen in XXI century. Frank 
Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leuffen, and Berthold Rittberger54 even wrote 
about the system of differentiated integration, in which differentiation is 
an essential and enduring characteristic of the EU.
The European Union is the most advanced, integrated, regional 
organisation in the world. It originated from that of a free trade area, moving 
on to a customs union, and to recent times possessing a common market, 
and being on the verge of an economic and political union. Therefore, the 
European integration project only knew one direction which has been 
the tying of the European Member States ever closer together (at least 
considering the intentions) since its foundation after World War II.55 This 
is why European integration serves as fertile ground for scientifi c analysis 
and for developing ideas for theorising disintegration as well as various 
forms of differentiated integration.
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